Designing elections in conflict-prone divided societies : the case of South Sudan by Dreef, Sofie & Wagner, Wolfgang
Designing Elections in  
Conflict-Prone Divided  
Societies: the Case of 
South Sudan
Sofie Dreef/Wolfgang Wagner
PRIF-Report No. 122
the
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2013 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence to: 
PRIF  Baseler Str. 27-31  D-60329 Frankfurt am Main 
Telephone: +49(0)69 95 91 04-0  Fax: +49(0)69 55 84 81 
E-Mail: w.m.wagner@vu.nl, sofiedreef@gmail.com  Website: www.prif.org 
 
 
ISBN: 978-3-942532-57-0 
 
€ 10.00 
  
Summary 
Since the end of the Cold War the international community has dedicated much attention 
and effort to building peace in societies torn by ethnopolitical violence, as well as to pre-
venting the outbreak of violence in conflict-prone divided societies in the first place. De-
mocratization has remained a key feature in these peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
efforts, even though the effect of elections is ambivalent. On the one hand, elections are 
essential for ensuring representation and accountability. In the long term elections con-
tribute to peacebuilding by addressing the root causes of the conflict. They can ensure the 
representation of formerly excluded groups in parliament. Also, they can be designed in a 
way that fosters moderation and interethnic accommodation. Yet on the other hand, 
when hurried and poorly designed, elections can also threaten the precarious peace. This 
report focuses on the three main features of electoral design that crucially influence the 
success or failure of elections in conflict-prone divided societies: timing and sequencing, 
electoral administration, and electoral systems. Our report aims to go beyond purely 
scholarly debates and to translate the general insights into specific policy recommenda-
tions for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015 in South Sudan; the first elections 
since the country torn by ethnopolitical conflict gained independence in 2011. 
The debate on timing and sequencing of elections has focused on societies with a re-
cent history of ethnopolitical civil war that has often been brought to an end by a peace 
agreement proscribing elections. However, issues of timing and sequencing also arise 
when there is no tradition of regular free elections and questions of electoral engineering 
come to the fore. Proponents of early elections stress the indispensable role of elections in 
strengthening the legitimacy of the government. Interim governments are by definition 
undemocratic and the population lacks ownership of the institution. Furthermore, the 
longer elections are postponed the more time the former warring parties have to entrench 
themselves in power. Early elections strengthen the former warring factions over more 
moderate alternatives that have insufficient time to organize themselves and are thus un-
able to compete with them. Furthermore, the former warring parties are still the most 
powerful political actors with the means to return to violence in the case of unfavorable 
election results. Their commitment to democracy is questionable. Lastly, in the immedi-
ate aftermath of ethnopolitical conflict voters tend to vote for radical ethnopolitical entre-
preneurs rather than moderate candidates. This gives politicians an incentive to use popu-
list rhetoric and foster intolerance in order to get elected.  
Next to timing, the sequencing of elections also impacts on the success of elections. 
Having national and sub-national elections simultaneously can be advantageous for poor 
countries, because it is cost effective and easier for the electorate and the electoral admini-
stration. However, experience has shown that having to cast several votes in the same 
instance can also confuse voters. It can thus be advantageous to sequence elections. Some 
authors argue that national elections are internationally more important and easier to 
organize than sub-national ones and should therefore be first in the sequence. Others 
claim that it is better to conduct sub-national elections before national ones. This pro-
vides more time for the political parties and candidates to gain experience and build up a 
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local support base. All in all, we conclude that in most conflict-prone divided societies 
conditions are not favorable to early elections. Although sequencing elections appears to 
serve both political parties and the electorate best, given the financial strains many con-
flict-prone divided societies are facing this is often not a viable option. 
The second feature of electoral design that we study is the electoral administration. 
The electoral management body (EMB) is the institution primary responsible for admin-
istering the elections. It determines who is eligible to vote, receives and validates the 
nominations of the participating parties and candidates, conducts the polling, counts the 
votes and disseminates the results. The EMB thus has to decide about issues, such as eligi-
bility criteria for candidates and voter registration, which are highly politicized in divided 
societies. Electoral malpractice undermines public confidence in the credibility of the 
elections and thus risks the outbreak of violence. This is even true for unintentional ad-
ministrative errors; what matters is not if a technical irregularity occurred, but if it is per-
ceived as politically inspired. It is therefore essential that the EMB gains public confidence 
and ensures the integrity of the elections. This is considerably easier when the EMB is 
(perceived as) independent from the government, impartial in its conduct, transparent in 
its activities, authoritative and competent, and has adequate resources. This is easiest 
achieved when the EMB is a commission of technocrats. Their appointment should ad-
here to the principles of descriptive representation to gain trust from all conflicting ethnic 
groups.  
Last, we discuss the electoral system. This feature of electoral design has the most far-
reaching consequences for peacebuilding. Just like the timing of an election and the set-up 
of the electoral commission, the electoral system choice has an impact on the risk of the 
outbreak of violence. But contrary to timing and administration the electoral system also 
has long-term effects on peacebuilding. In ethnopolitical conflicts groups fight against the 
state or each other in order to protect their collective interests. Elections can provide a “stra-
tegic substitute” to this fighting. They allow formerly excluded groups representation, which 
enables them to voice their groups’ concerns in a non-violent way. A key objective of elec-
toral systems in conflict-prone divided societies is therefore to ensure the fair representation 
of minority ethnic groups in parliament (“descriptive representation”).  
The most prominent voice in the debate on electoral systems advocates (list) propor-
tional representation (list-PR). Almost by definition, list-PR facilitates the representation 
of ethnic minorities in parliament, especially when combined with large electoral districts 
and in absence of an electoral threshold. Yet we argue that list-PR only has this advantage 
vis-à-vis other electoral systems wherever ethnicities live intermingled throughout the 
entire country, like for example in Rwanda and Burundi. Wherever ethnic groups con-
centrate in specific regions, pluralist and majoritarian systems have similar inclusionary 
effects. This is because the minority groups form local majorities which allows their po-
litical representatives to perform quite well also under other electoral systems than list-
PR. Such concentrated settlement patterns are much more common than dispersed ones. 
Our recommendation for societies where ethnic groups settle in particular regions is to 
take into account the additional merits of majoritarian systems in overcoming ethnic 
cleavages, especially because list-PR runs the risk of reinforcing ethnic divisions. Because 
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they provide incentives for candidates to campaign for the votes of members of other 
ethnic groups, majoritarian systems encourage interethnic bargaining and promote ac-
commodative behavior. This contributes to the de-ethnicization of politics and society in 
the long term. 
In summary, the design of elections in conflict-prone divided societies has a significant 
impact on peacebuilding. With a view to timing, the evidence suggests that the risk of 
renewed violence can be lowered by not having elections (too) soon after the end of the 
conflict. In a similar vein, observers agree that independent, technocratic EMBs are the 
best guarantee against elections triggering new violence. In contrast, the electoral system 
choice has been discussed more controversially. We caution against recommending any 
electoral system across the board and argue that the choice of electoral system should be 
made dependent on the settlement patterns of ethnic groups in society. First and foremost 
the electoral system should ensure high levels of descriptive representation. If multiple 
systems have this effect, the additional benefits of the systems should inform the final 
choice. 
For South Sudan with its numerous political challenges, including the ongoing ani-
mosity with neighboring Sudan, the economic strain, the power struggle within the 
dominant political party, the SPLM, and ethnic violence, the 2015 elections can mark a 
turning point; positively or negatively. Through electoral engineering the risks associated 
with the elections can, to an extent, be mitigated. With regard to the timing and sequenc-
ing of elections it is pertinent that if the situation allows it, elections do take place in 2015. 
Establishing a regular election cycle, the development and professionalization of opposi-
tion parties and empowering the electorate are crucial for the stabilization of democracy 
and the prevention of increasing inter-ethnic violence. In terms of electoral administra-
tion, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) seems relatively well-equipped to carry 
out its task. This commission of technocrats is heavily supported by the international 
community with financial, physical and human capital. Whether the NEC will be viewed 
as credible and impartial will depend of course on their own behavior when politicians 
will try to influence them.  
The 2015 elections in South Sudan will be held under a mixed electoral system. This 
system has the advantage that it facilitates both descriptive representation, because of the 
list-PR component, and local representation through single member constituencies. Al-
though a pure list-PR or SMP (Single Member Plurality) system would be easier in terms 
of electoral administration, list-PR fails to provide the link between MPs and their con-
stituencies that is so important for the development of South Sudan’s remote countryside, 
whereas SMP risks the exclusion of minorities if district boundaries do not follow the 
settlement patterns of the ethnic groups. The mixed system therefore seems the most vi-
able option for the first elections in the history of South Sudan. 
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1. Introduction1 
Ethnopolitical conflicts2 have been high up on the international security agenda. The in-
ternational community has dedicated much attention and effort to building peace in soci-
eties torn by ethnopolitical violence as well as to preventing the outbreak of violence in 
conflict-prone divided societies in the first place. A minority of authors have claimed that 
ethnopolitical violence is inevitable as ethnicity is primordial and inherently conflict-
prone (Kaplan 1993). However, such a fatalist position can hardly explain why so many 
ethnically plural societies have not experienced violence and why those divided societies 
that slid into civil war often had long periods of peaceful co-existence. Most theories of 
ethnopolitical conflict therefore stress that ethnopolitical conflict is ‘manageable’ through 
carefully designed political institutions (Varshney 2007: 281-291).  
For various reasons institutional engineering – the design of new political structures 
and institutions – has revolved around democracy and elections. The collapse of the So-
viet Union and its allies meant an end to the main ideological challenger to liberal democ-
racy. At the same time, the third wave of democratization made democracy a widespread 
form of government throughout the world. Finally, academics kept presenting ever more 
evidence for the beneficial effects of democracy on peace (Doyle 1986). Although the so-
called Democratic Peace only applies to relations between mature democracies, research 
inspired by it suggests that democracies are less likely to experience civil wars.3 As a con-
sequence, democracy (and thus elections)4 became an unquestioned goal of institutional 
engineering.  
Yet in violence-prone divided societies conducting elections also poses a risk and can 
threaten the precarious stability of these countries. With some exceptions, such as Mo-
zambique, Cambodia and El Salvador, the elections that were part of the 1990s peace-
building missions are associated not with peace, but with conflict (Mansfield/Snyder 
2007: 253-257). According to Lars Brozus (2013: 1), more than 10,000 people have died in 
election-related violence since 2000. The often frustrating experience with elections in 
 
 
1  Research for this article was supported by the Berghof Foundation GmbH. We would like to thank Michael 
Lidauer and Jonas Wolff for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2  We follow Ted Robert Gurr's definition of ethnopolitical conflict as one in which “groups that define 
themselves using ethnic criteria make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or 
against other political actors” (1994: 348). 
3  See Dixon 2009; Hegre et al. 2001; Krain/Myers 1997. For a more critical perspective see the contributions 
in Spanger 2012. 
4  Democracy and elections are not synonymous. On the contrary, equating democratization with having 
elections, “risks confusing the goal and process with the mechanism, and often leads to a relapse into con-
flict” (Brahimi 2007: 10). Although building democracy indeed encompasses more than only conducting 
elections, elections are an essential mechanism for fostering democracy and are therefore an inherent fea-
ture of democratic peacebuilding. As Le Duc et al. point out, “the future of democracy in both established 
and emerging systems depends to a large extent on events related to the electoral process, because elec-
tions are the one political institution that both leads and reflects many of the social, political, and eco-
nomic trends” (1996: 4). 
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divided societies has given rise to an enormous literature on electoral engineering, i.e. the 
design of electoral institutions. Reviewing and advancing the debate about the design of 
elections in divided societies is at the heart of this report. 
Because electoral systems directly influence a country's political party system (Bogaards 
2004) and thus impact on the strength of the government, the opposition and their interac-
tion, they are widely considered the most important element in institutional engineering 
(Lijphart 1995: 412). We would like to emphasize from the outset, however, that success-
ful ethnopolitical conflict management depends on a multitude of additional factors, in-
cluding elite strategies, power-sharing agreements, outside support and the economy. A 
comprehensive treatment of all these other factors is, however, beyond the scope of this 
report and, as we will see, the debate about electoral engineering is already a very rich one.  
Our discussion of electoral engineering revolves around three key features, namely the 
timing and sequencing of elections, the electoral administration and the electoral system. 
It is important to note that our prime concern is not the success of democratization or the 
quality of democracy but the mitigation of ethnopolitical conflict. Although democratiza-
tion and conflict prevention/peacebuilding often overlap, they occasionally clash and 
create trade-offs to electoral engineers. This is most obvious with respect to the timing of 
elections: From a democratization perspective, postponing elections seems detrimental to 
building a viable democracy, but from a conflict theoretical perspective a postponement 
may be a prudent decision to minimize the risk of ethnopolitical violence.  
Our report aims to go beyond purely scholarly debates and to translate the general in-
sights into specific policy recommendations for the electoral design of one particular 
country; namely South Sudan, where the first parliamentary elections since the country 
gained independence in 2011 are scheduled for 2015. South Sudan is an interesting and 
suitable case for various reasons: It is a deeply divided society characterized by ethnopoli-
tical conflict. To be sure, the country is not a typical case of post-conflict peace-building 
as it only became independent in 2011. However, the country’s independence implied 
that decisions about the timing and sequencing of the elections, the electoral administra-
tion and the electoral system all had to be made. Whereas the international community 
pays much attention to the North-South conflict and the conflict in Darfur, South Sudan 
is also characterized by simmering intra-state ethnopolitical violence that could escalate 
on the occasion of competitive elections. From the perspective of electoral engineers, 
therefore, the challenge with a view to the South Sudanese elections in 2015 is comparable 
to the challenge to design elections for Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement 
or for Timor Leste after independence. 
The report is structured as follows: in the second section we address the goals of post-
conflict elections as well as the risks they pose in violence-prone divided societies. In sec-
tion 3 we give a brief overview of the history of the independence struggle in South Sudan 
as well as the current status of the democratization project. In the fourth section we exam-
ine the debate on the timing and sequencing of post-conflict elections. In section 5 we 
discuss electoral administration, including some guiding principles that can help electoral 
management bodies to ensure electoral integrity. In the sixth section we delve into the 
debate about electoral systems. The right timing and sequencing depends to a large extent 
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on the security situation, the country’s institutional capability and infrastructure and pos-
sible democratic traditions. The electoral administration proves to be challenging mostly 
in terms of implementation. The choice of electoral system, however, is widely debated in 
academic literature with proponents of (list) proportional representation dominating and 
adherents of so-called centripetalism as a vocal minority. We argue that a country's ethnic 
composition should be taken into account when deciding on which electoral system to 
use. Finally, in the conclusion we distill from those academic debates about electoral de-
sign important policy implications for the 2015 elections in South Sudan, in the hope that 
by taking into account lessons learned the country can continue on a path towards ethnic 
conflict resolution, instead of the path of increasing inter-ethnic violence. Throughout the 
report we make use of various examples. Needless to say, this study is not meant to be a 
case comparison, but rather aims to bring together academic debate and practitioners’ 
problems in designing elections in post-conflict divided societies. The cases mentioned in 
the various sections are thus for illustrative purpose only. 
2. The Goals and Risks of Elections in Conflict-Prone 
Divided Societies 
Elections serve multiple purposes. Most importantly, free and fair elections are an indis-
pensible element in any modern democracy. Not surprisingly, therefore, elections have 
mostly been studied by scholars of democracy and democratization.5 Scholars of conflict 
studies, however, are less interested in the democratic merits of elections per se but rather 
in the effects elections have on civil peace and political violence, in particular in inter-
ethnic relations. In this report, we assume the conflict studies perspective. We are less 
interested in the quality of democracy, but rather in the effects of elections on the pro-
spect of peaceful inter-ethnic relations. 
A number of conflict studies scholars have pointed out the risks that competitive elec-
tions bring about in divided societies. Elections may become the focal point of tensions 
and thus bear the risk of violence.6 Elections are competitions between individuals, parties 
and their ideas. They aim to highlight social choices and are by definition divisive: some 
win, others lose. Conflict and polarization are thus inherent features of elections (Paris 
1997: 74). This competitive logic of elections easily aggravates tensions in divided socie-
ties. Frequently, the very subject of democracy (i.e. the demos) is contested and some eth-
 
 
5  See for example the contributions to the journals Electoral Studies, Democratization and the Journal of 
Democracy. 
6  Following the pioneering work of Mansfield and Snyder, many scholars have focused on elections (and 
democratization more broadly) as a trigger for violence and (renewed) conflict (see, among many others, 
Paris 1997, 2004; Doyle/Sambanis 2006; Cederman/Hug/Krebs 2010). More recently, however, an inter-
esting literature has emerged that addresses violence before and during elections (see Collier/Vicente 
2012; Daxecker 2013; Kuhn 2013). 
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nic groups may not consider themselves as a part of a multi-ethnic society but instead aim 
at self-government (Mann 2005). In a process of democratization the old elites, fearful to 
lose power to the new groups who represent the forces behind the democratization proc-
ess, may try to mobilize the masses by appealing to nationalist sentiments and raising the 
question of the demos. This sharpens the divisions that already exist in conflict-prone 
divided societies. Especially if competing political parties engage in ethnic outbidding, 
ethnicity rather than socioeconomic issues becomes the focal point of electoral campaigns 
and voting (Mansfield/Snyder 1995: 7-8, 24-25). Often, countries in the process of de-
mocratization lack the institutional capability to control diverging political interests and 
protect minorities (Paris 1997: 55-57).  
Elections, however, do not only bring about risks but also make important contribu-
tions to the mitigation of conflict in divided societies. At a general level, elections (and 
democracy more broadly) can be seen as an alternative to violent conflict (Dunning 
2011). It is for this reason that democracies have a lower risk of experiencing violent con-
flict in the first place (Krain/Myers 1997; Hegre et al. 2001; Lacina 2006). The conflict-
mitigating effects of democracy go back to its ability to give a voice to all groups in society 
and to have their concerns heard, if not included in decision-making. In a recent quanti-
tative study, Lars-Eric Cederman, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min (2010) have demon-
strated that the exclusion of politically relevant groups enhances the risk of conflict sig-
nificantly. Including them into the political system therefore is a good strategy to prevent 
or overcome ethnopolitical conflict.  
The inclusive function of democracy makes descriptive representation a key criterion 
for the assessment of elections. Descriptive representation means that parliament is com-
posed in a way that accurately reflects the demographic characteristics of the society.7 For 
example, a society in which a third of the population belongs to a particular ethnic group 
should have roughly a third of the members of parliament from this group in order to be 
descriptively represented. The importance of descriptive representation goes back to the 
assumption that a group’s substantial interests (e.g. in having education in their native 
language) are most effectively pursued by members of this particular group - an assump-
tion widely shared among members of ethnic minorities in divided societies (Ruedin 
2009: 335). Political theorist Jane Mansbridge has argued that especially in a climate of 
distrust, “descriptive representation usually furthers the substantive representation of 
interests by improving the quality of deliberation” (1999: 654). When discussing the mer-
its and shortcomings of various electoral formulas, we will therefore use descriptive repre-
sentation as a key criterion. 
Although ensuring descriptive representation is the most important criterion for the 
assessment of electoral systems for divided societies, one further contribution of elections 
to the mitigation of conflict should be noted. In the longer term, elections can be designed 
in a way that fosters moderation and interethnic accommodation. By providing incentives 
 
 
7  For a comprehensive discussion of descriptive and other forms of representation see Pitkin 1967 and 
Ruedin 2013, chapter 1. 
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to candidates to appeal to voters beyond the own ethnic group, electoral systems can 
break the cycle of ethnic voting. As such, they can contribute to the de-ethnicization of 
politics and society in the long run (Simonsen 2005: 298). Elections foster people’s identi-
fication with and an ownership of the political system and pose constraints upon political 
leaders who are dependent on the electorate to stay in power (Reynolds/Sisk 1998: 15-18; 
Sisk 1998: 146-147).  
3. South Sudan 
The last two decades violence in the Sudan region has, more or less prominently, featured 
in the news. The conflict in Darfur is tragically still ongoing, whereas the civil war be-
tween the North and South officially came to an end with the signing of the 2005 Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement. Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan still exist, how-
ever, as is exemplified in the ongoing disputes about oil transportation and alleged 
support to rebel groups on Sudanese territory by the South Sudanese government. In con-
trast to the atrocities committed in both conflicts, as well as the difficult relation between 
Sudan and South Sudan, relatively little attention has been given to the ethnic strife within 
the newly independent state of South Sudan. For the future of South Sudan, however, it is 
crucial that ethnic relations are studied and understood in order to have targeted inter-
ventions that can prevent the current still low to medium scale ethnic violence from esca-
lating into another full-fledged civil war. This section aims to give an insight in the cur-
rent ethnic relations in South Sudan, as well as the ongoing democratization project.  
3.1 Ethnicity in South Sudan 
The South Sudanese society is ethnically highly diverse. According to one estimate, it has 
more than 56 ethnic and almost 600 sub-ethnic groups (Ferrie 2011: 1) which are sub-
divided into independent tribes, clans and lineages. The ethnic group taxonomy is not on 
socio-economic or cultural activities but on shared language.8 Based on ethno-linguistic 
affiliation, South Sudan’s ethnic groups fall into three broader categories: the Nilotic, 
Nilo-Hamitic and the South-Western Sudanic groups. The Nilotic group includes the 
three politically most relevant ethnic groups, namely the Dinka (Greater Bahr El Ghazal 
and Greater Upper Nile regions), the Nuer (Greater Upper Nile region) and the Shilluk 
(Upper Nile State).9 The exact sizes of these groups are hard to establish. The most recent 
census, which was conducted in 2008, faced numerous administrative and technical chal-
 
 
8  Email correspondence between Sofie Dreef and Mr. Jacob Dut Chol, Chairperson of the Center for De-
mocracy and International Analysis; 21 May 2013. 
9  For a classification of most ethnic groups, see the South Sudan Country Profile by UNMISS, 
http://bit.ly/182U75Z (21 August 2013). A map with administrative boundaries and ethnic settlements 
can be found at http://bit.ly/19ZSuJO (21 August 2013). 
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lenges. The government of Southern Sudan rejected the results, accusing the Northern 
administrative body of manipulating the figures.10 Table 1 provides a rough estimate of 
ethnic group sizes of the largest ethnic groups (> 3 % of the total population).  
Table 1: South Sudan’s major ethnic groups (> 3% of population) 
Ethnic group State(s) of origin Approximate % of population 
Dinka Western Bahr El Ghazal, Northern Bahr El 
Ghazal, Warrap, Jonglei, Upper Nile, Lakes 
40 
Nuer Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity 20 
Azande Western Equatoria 10 
Toposa Eastern Equatoria   8 
Shilluk Upper Nile   5 
Murle Jonglei   4 
Source: Young 2006, p. 16. 
The Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk are all pastoralist peoples, but where the Dinka and Nuer are 
mobile and migrate with the seasons, the Shilluk are settlers. For all ethnic groups cattle are 
of enormous symbolic, religious and economic value. Cows are a method of payment of 
debts, fines and bride prices, and ownership of livestock determines one’s status and influ-
ence in society. Conflicts over grazing grounds and cattle raiding between ethnic (sub-) 
groups have been an inherent feature of inter-ethnic relations since long before independ-
ence. However, several factors including the war and later the oil dispute with the North, the 
influx of humanitarian aid and the monetization of the economy have made the pastoralist 
lifestyle increasingly difficult to sustain, which leads to increasing ethnic conflict. Further-
more, with the conflict with Sudan came an influx of small arms. This makes ethnic clashes 
increasingly violent and often even deadly. Conflicts occur both between ethnic groups, 
such as Dinka against Nuer, and between ethnic sub-groups, for example between Nuer Lou 
and Nuer Bul or between Dinka Bor and Dinka Agar. It could even go down to tribes or 
clans, such as Dinka Bor inter-clan conflicts. Ethnic conflict in South Sudan is thus fre-
quent, diverse and can occur on the more general ethnic group level down to family feuds.  
 
3.2 The North-South Conflict and Its Impact on Ethnic Relations 
in the South 
Since gaining independence from the British in 1956 the Sudan region has experienced 
more years of conflict than of peace. The first civil war started when southern leaders 
 
 
10  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with Mr. Isaiah Chol Aruai, Chairperson of the National Bureau of 
Statistics; 19 February 2013 in Juba, South Sudan. 
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accused the new authorities in Khartoum of reneging on their promise to create a federal 
state and of trying to impose Arabic culture and Islam on the southern region. The south-
ern Anya Nya guerrilla movement started a secessionist armed struggle against the Suda-
nese government, which ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement. The peace 
agreement granted significant regional autonomy to Southern Sudan. It allowed the re-
gion its own legislative and executive bodies that would be responsible for all issues but 
national defense, national planning and foreign affairs. Also, it recognized southern reli-
gion, language and traditional laws. However, the peace agreement also caused tension in 
the south between the Dinka and the Equatorian groups (including, among other groups, 
the Bari, Zande, Acholi, Madi, Moru, and Kuku). Before 1972 southern Sudan had been 
split into the three provinces of Greater Bahr El Ghazal, Greater Equatoria and Greater 
Upper Nile, which were separately answerable to the central Sudanese government. The 
Addis Ababa Agreement unified these three provinces into the single autonomous region 
of Southern Sudan. The inhabitants of Greater Equatoria, fearing the dominant position 
of the Dinka in the new Southern administration, favored the old decentralized system of 
government. They actively pushed for Kokora, i.e. the re-division of Southern Sudan into 
the three provinces. The people of Greater Bahr El Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile, on the 
other hand, severely opposed fragmentation of the southern region as they felt the south 
acting as a bloc had greater leverage over the north.  
In 1983 the Khartoum government by decree abolished the Southern government and 
Legislative Assembly, re-divided Southern Sudan in three provinces and greatly reduced 
its degree of autonomy (Branch/Mampilly 2005: 5). This re-division of the region was one 
of the triggers for the foundation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
and its armed wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) by a group of prominent 
Dinka under the leadership of Colonel Dr. John Garang de Miabor in the county of Bor in 
Greater Upper Nile (Jonglei State). In its early days the SPLM/A recruited its members 
mainly in Dinka and Nuer areas. Because of their disagreement about the implementation 
of Kokora the Equatorian people viewed the SPLM/A as a Dinka movement rather than a 
southern nationalist movement and were reluctant to join. The Dinka and Nuer-domi-
nated SPLM/A leadership, in turn, did little to involve them. South-South ethnic relations 
became increasingly strained when in 1991 the SPLM/A leadership had a fall-out and the 
movement split along ethnic lines. Dr. Riek Machar (ethnic Nuer), Lam Akol (ethnic Shil-
luk) and Gordon Kong (ethnic Nuer) broke away from the SPLM/A to form the Nuer-
dominated SPLA-United faction, which controlled large parts of the countryside in the 
Upper Nile region. The Dinka-dominated SPLM/A under the leadership of Dr. John Ga-
rang, on the other hand, controlled most of the Equatoria and Bahr El Ghazal regions. 
The leadership of both factions targeted each other’s civilian population, thereby reinforc-
ing the ethnic cleavage among the southern Sudanese (Jok/Hutchinson 1999: 128). One of 
the most dramatic events of south-south ethnic enmity was the 1991 Bor Massacre. A 
group of Nuer forces led by Machar raided the Dinka Bor counties (Duk, Twic East and 
Bor Counties) where Garang had founded the SPLM/A, killing hundreds, some say thou-
sands, of civilians. Garang and his forces retaliated by attacking numerous Nuer villages 
(Hutchinson 2001: 308; The Economist 2010). In August 2011 Machar, then Vice Presi-
dent of South Sudan, publicly acknowledged his responsibility and apologized for the 
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1991 massacre, because “Giving an apology is the best way of bringing in peace” (Machar 
quoted in The Sudan Tribune, 3 April 2012).  
In 1995 the SPLA-United faction split when Akol broke with Machar. Machar became 
the leader of the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), while Akol 
became the chairman of the SPLA-United. Both armed groups signed a deal with the Su-
danese government; SSIM/A in 1996 and the SPLA-United in 1997. In subsequent years 
Machar and Akol both served the government of Sudan, but in 2000 Machar went back to 
southern Sudan to form the Sudan People’s Democratic Front.11 Two years later, Machar 
and Garang reconciled. The merger of the Sudan People’s Democratic Front with the 
SPLM/A significantly strengthened the support base of the SPLM/A. In 2003, the move-
ment was also rejoined by Akol and his militia (Young 2006: 14-15).  
During the 22 years of civil war in Sudan, according to UN estimates over two million 
people lost their lives, another four million were displaced and around 600,000 people 
fled the country as refugees due to both north-south and south-south violence. In January 
2005 the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), which marked a final end to this protracted war. The CPA set out a 
six-year interim period during which the newly established Government of Southern Su-
dan (GoSS) enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. The interim period culminated in the 
January 2011 referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan from the north. Across 
all regions and ethnic groups, the people of Southern Sudan overwhelmingly voted for 
self-determination. Six months later the interim period came to an end and the Republic 
of South Sudan was officially born.  
3.3 Ongoing Ethnic Strife in South Sudan  
Despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that put an end to over two decades of vio-
lent conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A and the euphoric atmos-
phere in South Sudan when it became the world’s youngest state, neither the peace 
agreement nor independence mark an end to violence in South Sudan altogether. During 
the North-South conflict South Sudan’s different ethnic groups, with mixed results, tried 
to unite against a common enemy under the banner of the strive for independence. Yet a 
unified Southern Sudanese identity based on (a mix of) a shared history, language, cul-
ture, etcetera, does not exist (Branch/Mampilly 2005: 4). Two years down the road of 
independence ethnic violence has re-emerged in most of the country’s ten states. The 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reports multiple low to medium scale intra-state 
ethnic conflicts in South Sudan in 2012.12 Between the Murle, Bor Dinka and Lou Nuer of 
Upper Nile State a historic animosity exists. The groups compete over resources in the 
form of water and, most importantly, cattle. The Murle have a reputation of cattle raiding, 
 
 
11  For a detailed account of the SPLM/A split and subsequent militarization of Dinka and Nuer ethnic iden-
tities, see Jok/Hutchinson (1999).  
12  See UCDP Encyclopedia, www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php (21 August 2013). 
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which occasionally leads to violent ethnic clashes. The hostility between the groups has 
been instrumentalized by politicians during the North-South conflict, when the Sudanese 
government tried to play the southern groups against each other in order to weaken the 
independence movement. Still, politicians use the tension between the ethnic groups to 
gain power and influence. In Western Bahr El Ghazal State, Dinka and Balanda clashed 
violently because of disagreement over the relocation of the administrative headquarters 
of Wau County, which the former group supported and the latter opposed. Cross state 
border fighting occurred between the Gok Dinka from Lakes State and the Rek Dinka 
from Warrap State. UCDP lists resources such as cattle, water and pasture, and political 
power as the main sources of violence. A historic rivalry between the Luac Jang Dinka 
from Warrap State and the Buel Nuer from Unity State has also led to violent clashes in 
2012. Although the immediate cause of fighting is cattle raiding, the conflict between the 
two sub-ethnic groups is part of the broader Dinka-Nuer animosity and their competition 
for political power. The intensity of these south-south ethnic conflicts has only increased 
in recent years because of the wide spread of small arms, high levels of youth unemploy-
ment and the huge gap between the people’s expectations of life post-independence and 
the challenging social reality on the ground (African Development Bank 2012: 2). 
3.4 Ethnicity in Politics 
South Sudan has its first democratic elections scheduled for 2015, yet the country gained 
some experience with elections already in 2010. The 2010 elections conducted throughout 
the then still unified territory of Sudan were considered “one of the key elements in the 
strategy to develop a more equitable, stable, and inclusive political system in Sudan” (El-
Battahani 2010: 38). Six elections were conducted simultaneously: one for the President of 
the Republic of Sudan, one for the President of the Government of Southern Sudan 
(GoSS), one for the Governors of each of the 25 states, one for the Members of the Na-
tional Legislative Assembly (NLA), one for the Members of the Southern Sudan Legisla-
tive Assembly (SSLA) and one for the Members of State Legislative Assemblies (SLAs). 
The latter three elections were held under a mixed system (see chapter 6) and each con-
sisted of three ballot papers. Voters thus had to cast a total of 12 votes at once. 
Hopes that the elections would provide a popular mandate for the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement were, however, ill-founded. Originally scheduled for 2008 – the half-
way point of the roadmap laid down in the CPA – the elections were postponed to 2010 
due to disputes between the President Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and the 
SPLM. Instead of a mechanism providing increased political representation to the mar-
ginalized Southern region the elections were merely a last step in the process towards the 
2011 referendum on independence (Curless 2010: 4). The elections were tainted by logis-
tical and technical difficulties, such as an inaccurate voter registry and shortage of materi-
als, insufficient civic and voter education, a lack of transparency, and intimidation and 
harassment of opposition candidates. Different observer missions state in their final re-
ports that although the electoral process was generally peaceful, it fell far short of interna-
tional democratic standards (Carter Center 2010; European Union 2010). 
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Unsurprisingly, the presidential elections were won by incumbent candidate President 
Bashir. The SPLM candidate, Yasir Arman, had withdrawn from the race before the poll-
ing. SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir, who had served as the First Vice President of Sudan after 
Dr. John Garang died in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005,13 was reappointed by Bashir 
as his First Vice President after the 2010 elections in accordance with the stipulations of 
the CPA. 
Since the signing of the CPA and establishment of the Government of Southern Su-
dan, Kiir had also served as the President of the GoSS. In 2010 he was re-elected with an 
overwhelming majority: 92,99%, compared to 7,01% for his only opposition, SPLM-DC 
candidate Lam Akol. Since the foundation of the GoSS Riek Machar had served as the 
Vice President, and after the 2010 elections he was re-appointed by Kiir. 
Prior to the 2010 elections the allocation of seats for both the NLA (seated in Khar-
toum) and the SSLA (seated in Juba) was stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment. In the NLA, the NCP had 52% of the seats; the SPLM 28%; other Northern political 
forces 14%; and other Southern political forces 6% (CPA 2005, Protocol on Power Shar-
ing 2004, Article 2.5.5). After the 2010 elections there was a reshuffle of seats in the NLA: 
the NCP won 72,42% of the seats; the SPLM 22,2%; and the remainder of the political 
parties (Northern and Southern) all less than 1%. In the SSLA, the allocation of seats prior 
to the 2010 elections was as follows: 70% SPLM; 15% NCP; and 15% other Southern po-
litical forces (CPA 2005, Protocol on Power Sharing 2004, Article 3.5.1). Afterwards, the 
SPLM secured 94,7% of the seats; independent candidates 4,12%; and the SPLM-DC and 
NCP both 0,59% (NEC 2010: 48).  
Shortly after the 2011 referendum, President Kiir appointed a Constitutional Review 
Committee tasked with reviewing and adapting the Interim Constitution of Southern 
Sudan which was established in 2005 within the framework of the CPA. The Transitional 
Constitution proposed by the Committee was adopted by a two-third majority of the 
SSLA and came into force on July 9, 2011, the day of independence. The Transitional 
Constitution lays out the process for drafting a permanent constitution for South Sudan. 
In January 2012 President Kiir established the National Constitutional Review Commis-
sion (NCRC), which is tasked with reviewing the Transitional Constitution, conducting 
civic education and public consultation, and drafting the permanent constitution. The 
initial timeframe for this process was one year, but was marred by a lack of funding, slug-
gishness due to the large size of the NCRC and disputes about its composition – e.g. about 
the number of political versus civil society representatives, the number of representatives 
from SPLM vs. other political parties, and the underrepresentation of women and youth. 
In May 2013 the mandate of the NCRC was extended to December 31, 2014.  
 
 
13  Article 2.3.5 of the CPA 2005, Protocol on Power Sharing 2004 stipulates that “the current SPLM Chair-
man (or his successor) shall be the First Vice President and shall at the same time hold the posts of Presi-
dent of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People’s Lib-
eration Army (SPLA)”. 
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Key issues under discussion are the powers of the President vis-à-vis the legislature 
and the degree of federalism. The Transitional Constitution established a decentralized 
system of governance, with three levels of government: “(a) the national level, which will 
exercise authority in respect of the people and the states; (b) the state level of government, 
which shall exercise authority within a state, and render public services through the level 
closest to the people; and (c) local government level within the state, which shall be the 
closest level to the people” (Article 47). South Sudan has a presidential system of govern-
ment, with a President who is Head of State, Head of Government, and Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces (Article 97(2)). The national legislature comprises of two 
houses: the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and the Council of States. Members of 
the NLA are directly elected. Up until the 2015 elections the NLA includes all members of 
the former SSLA that were elected in 2010, plus all South Sudanese who were members of 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Sudan, plus additional members appointed by 
the President at his discretion (Article 56). The Council of States includes representatives 
elected by their respective State Assemblies, plus all South Sudanese who were representa-
tives in the Council of States of the Republic of Sudan, plus additional members ap-
pointed by the President at his discretion (Article 58).  
The Transitional Constitution does not include any stipulations regarding the ethnic-
ity of the (Vice) President, nor does it set ethnic quota for the national legislature. Ac-
cording to Article 71 the political party with the second highest number of seats in each 
House should appoint a Minority Leader, which ranks fourth in protocol in conduct of 
business of the respective House (after the President, Vice President and the Speaker of 
the House). Also, he has the right of second reply to an address to the House by the Presi-
dent (the right of first reply lies with the Minister designated to lead government business 
in the respective House). Although the Minority Leaders theoretically do not have to be 
from a different ethnic group than the majority party, the political parties that are better 
organized generally have a regional support base. For example, the largest opposition 
party founded by Lam Akol, the SPLM-DC, draws its support mainly from the Shilluk in 
Upper Nile state. The current Minority Leader in the NLA is Hon. Onyoti Adigo, the 
SPLM-DC representative and an ethnic Shilluk. 
Although the dominant party SPLM has support bases all over the country, it is gener-
ally considered to be a ‘Dinka party’. Because of its role in the liberation struggle the party 
long managed to get buy-in from the large majority of South Sudanese, regardless of their 
ethnic identity. Cultivating this identity as South Sudan’s liberation movement and stress-
ing the virtual absence of other political parties during the struggle for independence has 
served the SPLM well. As Dong Samuel Luak, Chairman of the South Sudan Law Society, 
points out: “The SPLM tries to distract people by focusing on the liberation struggle. Peo-
ple see political parties as an enemy, rather than an alternative voice [to the SPLM]”.14 
Nevertheless, now that South Sudan is independent the people become increasingly criti-
 
 
14  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with Mr. Dong Samuel Luak, Chairperson of the South Sudan Law 
Society; 19 February 2013 in Juba, South Sudan. 
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cal of the government and demand basic services. The main challenge for the SPLM is 
therefore to transform from a liberation movement into a political party. The party heavi-
ly dominates the NLA and has co-opted smaller opposition parties. But the public is not 
unreservedly positive about the SPLM’s performance as the government party. Aware of 
this, the party struggles with how to re-position itself. Some observers even predict a split 
in the party – a development that could actually benefit a more vibrant, plural democratic 
culture in South Sudan if this split would be along ideological, instead of ethnic, lines. 
Unfortunately, at the moment, ethnicity is the focal point of SPLM internal strife. The 
main fault line is between President Salva Kiir – a Dinka – and former Vice President 
Riek Machar – a Nuer. The power struggle between the two most prominent SPLM mem-
bers is not confined to back rooms, but played out in the open. During his Vice Presiden-
cy Machar challenged the position of Kiir by announcing that he would bid for the 
SPLM’s chairmanship, which would automatically make him the SPLM presidential can-
didate in the 2015 elections. In April 2013 President Kiir stroke back by restricting 
Machar to his constitutionally mandated functions as VP and withdrawing his other port-
folios, most notably his chairmanship of the National Reconciliation Committee. Ten-
sions culminated on July 23, 2013, when President Kiir dismissed Machar along with all 
ministers and deputy ministers of the cabinet. At the moment of writing (August 2013), 
the situation in the country remains calm, but tense. Rumor has it that Machar may break 
away from the SPLM, but in order to form a successful opposition party he needs to be 
very organized and have a solid support base.15 The five-yearly SPLM Convention which 
was planned for May 2013 would have determined whether the SPLM could close the 
ranks. Yet because of internal divisions among the SPLM top leadership the Convention 
has been postponed, without a clear timeframe. This can be seen as an indication that the 
2015 elections will be contentious.16  
A violent split would be detrimental to the precarious security situation in South Su-
dan. Unfortunately, except for the large presence of the international community in the 
country many factors do not contribute to a stable South Sudan, but actually make the 
country more conflict prone. The ongoing dispute between Sudan and South Sudan about 
oil transportation fees and the funding of rebel groups on each other’s soil does not only 
threaten the precarious peace between the two countries, but also severely damages South 
Sudan’s development as the country relies on oil for 98% of its revenue. Given the enor-
mous expenses involved with constitution making and organizing elections, this loss of 
revenues has direct implications for the democratization process. For example, the consti-
tutional review process involves, among other expenses, nationwide civic education and 
public consultations. So far, however, the process has been stalled (partly) due to a lack of 
funding. Similarly the 2015 elections are a very expensive endeavor, including a nation-
 
 
15  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with a member of an international NGO; February 2013 in Juba, 
South Sudan; see also The Economist (23 April 2013), ‘Curbing ambitions’, http://econ.st/15K5AuL (21 
August 2013).  
16  Email correspondence between Sofie Dreef and Mr. Robert Irish, Field Operations Manager at IFES South 
Sudan; July 2013.  
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wide census, civic and voter education, training electoral observers, etcetera. Although 
budgets for the National Elections Committee (NEC) and the National Bureau of Statis-
tics responsible for conducting the census have been approved, given the current financial 
situation it is unlikely that the Government of South Sudan can afford democratization 
unless the donor community steps in. Just as problematic as the lack of funds, however, 
are high levels of unemployment, corruption, the narrowing of political space, low literacy 
rates and virtual absence of a health care system. The history of ethnic strife between 
South Sudanese ethnic groups adds to this. Whether South Sudan can live up to the sky 
high expectations raised by independence therefore is, for the time being, rather unlikely. 
4. Timing and Sequencing 
The debate about timing and sequencing of elections has emerged from the broader dis-
cussion about peacebuilding.17 As a consequence, the debate has focused on societies with 
a recent history of ethnopolitical civil war that has often been brought to an end by a 
peace agreement proscribing elections. However, issues of timing and sequencing also 
arise when there is no tradition of regular free elections and questions of electoral engi-
neering come to the fore. In the case of South Sudan the reference point for timing and 
sequencing is the country’s independence, which is the end point of the roadmap created 
by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
Despite the risks associated with elections in conflict-prone divided societies, they do 
have the potential to foster moderation and interethnic accommodation and to address 
the root causes of conflict. This is not to say, however, that in response to ethnopolitical 
conflict elections should be organized immediately. In countries like South Sudan with a 
long history of civil war and hardly any experience with democratic elections, the right 
timing of elections and sequencing of national and sub-national elections is crucial for the 
success of elections as a peacebuilding mechanism.  
4.1 Timing 
Since the end of the Cold War the average time between the end of a civil war and the first 
post-conflict elections has halved: from 5.6 years prior to 1989 to 2.7 years after 1989 
(Brancati/Snyder 2011: 470; 2013: 823). In the 1990s early elections were conducted in for 
example Angola (peace agreement in 1991, elections in 1992), Mozambique (peace 
agreement in 1992, elections in 1994) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (peace agreement in 
 
 
17  The literature on democratization has also discussed issues of timing and sequencing with a view of build-
ing a stable and viable democracy. However, as pointed out above, we are less interested here in the im-
pact of timing and sequencing on the prospects and quality of democracy, but instead focus on the impact 
on ethnopolitical conflict. 
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1995, elections in 1996). The success of these elections, however, varied considerably. 
Whereas the elections in Mozambique strengthened the peacebuilding process (Reilly 
2008: 158), early elections proved detrimental to peace in Angola. The still heavily armed 
rebel group resumed fighting once it became clear that it would lose the elections, leading 
to another decade of brutal civil war (Doyle/Sambanis 2006: 312). Peacebuilding dramas 
like Angola did not, however, change the trend of having elections quickly after the end of 
a conflict (Brancati/Snyder 2011: 470; 2013: 823). The international community often 
pushes for early elections because they not only view it as a recipe for quick democratiza-
tion, but also as their own exit strategy. Elections mark the endpoint of peacebuilding, 
after which the international community can start to disengage. Donor countries face 
strong domestic political pressure for quick results and will therefore push to have elec-
tions, the earlier the better (Reilly 2008: 167). 
Advocates for early elections stress the indispensable role of elections in strengthening 
the legitimacy of the government (Doyle/Sambanis 2006: 312). Elections mark the transi-
tion of power from an interim government that was established in the aftermath of the 
war to the local authorities. This interim government can be international or domestic in 
nature, but is by definition undemocratic. The longer an international interim govern-
ment rules, the more it risks accusations of neo-imperialism and alienating the popula-
tion. Domestic interim governments generally consist of former warring factions. With-
out a clear and reasonable timeframe for elections these groups can entrench themselves 
in power, which makes it difficult for newly formed parties to compete with them in the 
elections (Diamond 2006: 99). Groups that are excluded from the interim regime there-
fore often push for early elections and may even threaten to use violence when they sense 
that postponing the elections limits their chances to get access to power (Brancati/Snyder 
2013: 825). Although the legitimacy argument is most compelling in the aftermath of a 
civil war, it could also be applied to South Sudan. The current South Sudanese govern-
ment was formed after the 2010 elections and is therefore not an interim government as 
such. But the legitimacy of the National Legislative Assembly can be called into question 
given the rigging18 of the 2010 elections and the presidential appointment of additional, 
non-elected, members to the NLA. Having new elections quickly after independence 
could have strengthened the legitimacy of the legislature.  
On the other hand, early elections favor the former warring parties and may therefore 
undermine peace. Because of the short time span new political parties that articulate other 
than the civil war cleavages do not have sufficient time to organize themselves and build 
capacity to be able to compete (Brahimi 2007: 10). The former warring parties are still the 
most powerful political actors with the means to return to violence in the case of unfavor-
able election results (Reilly 2002; Paris 2004). Besides, former warring parties that win the 
elections are not necessarily committed to the democratic process. Instead, they may use 
 
 
18  As Parvinder Singh, Country Director of IFES South Sudan, pointed out in an interview with Sofie Dreef, 
in some places the election result in 2010 100% for one party, with a 100% voter turnout (11 February 
2013, Juba, South Sudan). 
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their ‘democratic’ mandate to further their conflict agenda (Reilly 2002: 121). In 1997 the 
Liberian electorate voted warlord Charles Taylor into power as they feared that his loss 
would lead to more violence. As the democratically elected leader of Liberia, Taylor gov-
erned in an arbitrary manner, repressing the opposition and dismantling the democratic 
institutions that had brought him to power. This triggered another outbreak of civil war 
(Paris 2010: 341). Furthermore, in divided societies voters tend to vote more extreme in 
early post-conflict elections with the memory of conflict still fresh, than after a longer 
transition period (Reilly 2002: 121). Politicians thus have an incentive to use populist 
rhetoric and foster intolerance and even violence. For these reasons, Brancati and Snyder 
stress the need for a longer-term election strategy in complex situations. In contrast to 
“states that are small, pliable, or reasonably well prepared for a democratic transition”, in 
societies with high levels of insecurity, bad infrastructure and little democratic tradition it 
takes considerable time to create the necessary preconditions for successful elections 
(2011: 485-487). South Sudan is one of those complex cases in which early elections may 
prove risky. As was discussed in section 3, insecurity is still paramount due to ethnic rival-
ries. The infrastructure is in a dire state: during the rainy season that lasts from April to 
October, large parts of the country are inaccessible by road. Political opposition is virtually 
absent, whereas the SPLM is still closely intertwined with the national army, the former 
SPLA. All in all, conditions are thus not favorable to early, vibrant, competitive elections.  
4.2 Sequencing 
Although national elections generally get most attention both internationally and domes-
tically, in order to ensure proper service delivery a representative and accountable gov-
ernment should exist not only on the national, but also on the sub-national level. Elec-
tions should therefore be conducted on multiple levels. Holding several elections 
simultaneously can be advantageous for poor countries such as South Sudan, because it is 
cost effective and easier for the electorate. Because of the weak infrastructure it can be 
challenging for voters to make their way to the ballot box, so voter turnout is likely to be 
higher if people can vote in multiple elections at once. At the same time, however, experi-
ence has shown that casting a vote on several ballot papers in the same instance can also 
be confusing to voters; for example in 2010, the largely illiterate population of Southern 
Sudan had to cast 12 different votes in their first elections ever (Von Gienanth et al. 2008: 
97). Also, simultaneous elections are demanding in terms of electoral administration, 
which can lead to delays in announcing the results. Another option is therefore to se-
quence, or log, elections. Some authors argue for conducting national elections first. They 
have a higher profile than sub-national elections and are therefore more likely to attract 
international support in the form of trainings, electoral observation and financial re-
sources (Von Gienanth et al. 2008: 17). Others argue to conduct sub-national elections 
“build on village- and community-based mechanisms rooted in tradition” before national 
ones. According to Brahimi, national elections are politically and procedurally more sen-
sitive and therefore require a longer preparation time (2007: 11). Having sub-national 
elections first grants political parties time to organize themselves and build up a local 
support base. Furthermore, candidates can gain some political experience before they take 
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the step to national politics (Diamond 2006: 109). In a quantitative study Brancati and 
Snyder tested how the timing of national and sub-national post-conflict elections affected 
the likelihood of the recurrence of civil war. They found that early national elections in 
particular are associated with a higher risk of violence (2013: 840). This suggests that it 
may be worthwhile to sequence sub-national elections before national ones.  
4.3 Interim Conclusion 
There is no consensus on the ideal timeframe for elections in conflict-prone divided soci-
eties. The validity of the arguments given in favor and against early elections depends on 
the context in which they take place. The timing of elections is therefore best decided 
upon on a case-by-case basis. Early elections have some clear benefits and are not by defi-
nition harmful as long as the main factors hampering elections – security problems, a lack 
of democratic tradition and institutional capability, and bad infrastructural conditions – 
are absent. It is evident that in most conflict-prone societies conditions are not favorable 
to early elections, but there are exceptions.19 
In South Sudan the preparation time for the first post-independence elections is four 
years. Although the 2015 elections will be the second time that the population goes to the 
polls, no strong democratic tradition and/or democratic institutions have developed yet. 
Certain election-related legislation has been adopted already, such as the Political Parties 
Act and the National Elections Act, but additional regulatory frameworks still need to be 
drafted. South Sudan intends to conduct a census prior to the elections, but this is a very 
costly operation that requires a lot of planning. A myriad of political parties exists, but 
many of them are so-called “briefcase parties” without a party manifesto, let alone an 
electoral program. Capacity building of political parties as well as civic and voter educa-
tion for the largely illiterate population are of primary importance. A further complica-
tion is that the preparations for the elections run parallel to the review of the constitution. 
Although technically the constitutional review and organization of the elections are sepa-
rate processes, many South Sudanese stakeholders stress that the current Transitional 
Constitution is undemocratic. For example, it does not stipulate a limit on the number of 
terms the president can serve and it grants the president the power to appoint members of 
the legislative assembly. The sequencing of these processes is therefore a serious issue in 
South Sudan. The (extended) term of the constitutional review commission ends in De-
cember 2014, shortly before the elections. Some stakeholders are afraid that the current 
legislative assembly will adopt a constitution that closely resembles the transitional one 
and lacks the changes necessary to make the government more democratic and transpar-
 
 
19  One such exception is Macedonia. The 2002 elections were conducted only a year after the government and 
the rebels signed a peace agreement. Prior to the conflict, however, Macedonia had conducted three democ-
ratic elections. Political parties already existed and voters had gained some experience with elections, so the 
2002 elections fitted into the regular election cycle. The conflict in Macedonia lasted for less than a year, the 
number of casualties remained limited to several dozen on either side and there was no severe infrastructural 
damage. Early elections therefore did not pose a problem to the stability of the country. 
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ent.20 Furthermore, many regions in South Sudan are still plagued with ethnic clashes. It is 
of great importance that a basic level of security is established before the elections take 
place. Whether the four year time period between independence and the elections is suffi-
cient remains to be seen, but it is clear that having elections much earlier would have 
posed a serious risk to the stability in South Sudan. 
The South Sudanese polls of 2015 will cover the Presidency, the National Legislative 
Assembly, the election of State Governors and the State Legislative Assemblies. Observers 
indicate that although this poses a challenge to democratically inexperienced population 
of South Sudan, given the economic strain this is the most viable option at the moment, 
both logistically and financially.21 However, in the future sequencing elections could have 
some distinct advantages. Polling could be brought back from seven days to one election 
day, which would be easier in terms of organization.22 Also, it would most likely lead to 
higher voter turnout, as voting will be quicker and voters do not have to stand in line for 
hours. Especially for women who have to take care of the household, the current proce-
dures are too time-consuming. Furthermore, by logging elections one election will not 
overshadow another. In light of the ongoing decentralization process in South Sudan, 
ample attention for sub-national elections is crucial. For their basic services citizens will 
be increasingly dependent on their sub-national governments. It is, however, difficult for 
voters to deepen their understanding of sub-national elections when they have to vote on 
eight different ballot papers at once, especially when the debate in the media will most 
likely focus on the more prominent national elections. 
Whatever the choice – early or postponed elections, multiple elections at once or na-
tional elections only – instead of setting a strict electoral agenda, a time frame should be 
drafted that establishes the sequence of events with the dates of these events relative to 
each other. For example, instead of stipulating that elections will be held on date X re-
gardless of the progress made on the preparations, the time frame should indicate that 
elections will be held Y time after the electoral commission is established and Z time after 
the completion of the census. Once the election date has been set, however, it is best to 
change it as little as possible to avoid accusations of manipulation (Von Gienanth et al. 
2008: 97). 
 
 
20  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with members of a South Sudanese NGO; February 2013 in Juba, 
South Sudan. 
21  Ibid. 
22  For this reason, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in South Sudan would favor 
logging elections, both national and sub-national and parliamentary and presidential. Interview by Sofie 
Dreef with Parvinder Singh, Country Director of IFES South Sudan, 11 February 2013, Juba, South Sudan. 
18 Sofie Dreef/Wolfgang Wagner
 
 
5. Electoral Administration 
Elections, wherever in the world they are conducted, pose an enormous challenge to the 
administrative body mandated with their organization. To a large extent this challenge is 
technical in the sense that it requires administrative skills and resources to meet them. In 
conflict-prone divided societies, however, the challenge is often compounded because 
many technicalities are highly politicized.  
The electoral management body (EMB) is the institution primarily responsible for 
administering the elections. Its core activities are (1) determining who is eligible to vote, 
(2) receiving and validating the nominations of the participating parties and candidates, 
(3) conducting the polling, (4) counting the votes, and (5) disseminating the results (Wall 
et al. 2006: 5). By carrying out these activities, the EMB has to ensure that the elections are 
organized and managed in a way that is efficient, transparent and fair. Failure to do so can 
trigger ethnopolitical violence; this is what happened in Kenya in 2007 (Jacobs 2011: 6). 
There are different types of electoral administration and international practice is diverse. 
Elections can be administered by the government; by the government but under supervision 
of an independent authority; or by an independent commission (López-Pintor 2000: 21-25). 
Although the former two models are the standard in established democracies, in conflict-
prone divided countries government-based electoral administrations may face legitimacy 
issues and accusations of manipulation by the incumbent (Pastor 1999: 12; López-Pintor 
2000: 120). It is for this reason that López-Pintor points out that “historical evidence as well 
as recent conclusions by observers, analysts and practitioners, almost unanimously indi-
cates that elections run by independent electoral bodies are preferable to those run by 
executives” (2000: 122). However, just like the electoral system (as will be discussed in the 
next section) the electoral administration model is often not deliberately chosen but a 
product of the colonial past (Jinadu 1997: 2; Wall et al. 2006: 6).  
5.1 Electoral Integrity 
In divided societies the issues on which the EMB has to decide, such as eligibility criteria 
for candidates and voter registration, are highly politicized. Because of simmering mis-
trust among competing ethnic groups, ethnic entrepreneurs may claim certain decisions 
by the EMB as partial to the rival ethnic group and therefore contest the entire electoral 
process. The eligibility to vote is a case in point. Because the demos is often contested in 
divided societies, the voter registry raises highly political questions about citizenship and 
the status of refugees. In the 1990s in Macedonia, for example, the ethnic Macedonian 
majority used the citizenship law to exclude many ethnic Albanians who had migrated 
from Kosovo to Macedonia in the 1980s from Macedonian citizenship because they had 
not acquired the citizenship of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in addition to their 
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Yugoslav one.23 In addition, the status of those working and living abroad has been heavi-
ly contested. Whereas the censuses of 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 referred to 
the concept of permanent residents, the 1994 and 2002 censuses refer to the concept of 
legal (usual) residents including “persons who have an official (legal) place of residence in 
the Republic of Macedonia, who at the time of the Census and for a maximum of one year 
prior to its conducting are temporarily working abroad” (Republic of Macedonia, State 
Statistical Office 2010: 49). Many ethnic Albanians have criticized this provision, as they 
are overrepresented among those working abroad for more than one year. What is more, 
they argue that they have been forced to work abroad as a result of discrimination in 
Macedonia, which is perpetuated by excluding them from the census. The embroilment of 
any census in inter-ethnic competition has led to the abandonment of the census that was 
begun in 2011. 
To complicate the work of the EMB further, it not only has to deal with politically sen-
sitive issues; its own composition, and related, the behavior of its members, can also be-
come a focal point of ethnic tensions. For elections in conflict-prone divided societies to 
be successful, it is essential that the EMB ensures the integrity of the elections. This can 
significantly reduce the likelihood of election-related violence. Conversely, electoral mal-
practice undermines public confidence in the credibility of the elections. It increases the 
risk of protests, which in the fragile environments of conflict-prone divided societies eas-
ily turn violent (Norris 2012: 2-4). Crucial to the concept of electoral malpractice is that 
electoral administrative errors have to be, or perceived to be, made on purpose in order 
for them to spark popular discontent. Elections in conflict-prone divided societies take 
place in a context of uncertainty, fear and mistrust. In such an environment administra-
tive errors are likely to trigger violence if one group senses that their former adversary is 
purposely spoiling the electoral process and feels disadvantaged. As Robert A. Pastor 
points out, “many elections fail because one party interprets a ‘technical irregularity’ as 
politically-inspired by its opponents, whereas it might be due to administrative failures” 
(1999: 1). It is thus of vital importance that the EMB can reassure the population in gen-
eral and the former warring parties in particular that an administrative error was unin-
tended and an exception, rather than the rule. Pastor lists a number of guiding principles 
for EMBs to gain this public confidence. According to him, an EMB that is “independent, 
impartial, authoritative, and competent, and perceived as such, with adequate resources, 
has a far greater likelihood of conducting an election that is judged fair and free by all 
parties in a country and by the international community than one that does not have 
these attributes” (1999: 17-18). The EMB should take decisions independently, without 
being subjected to partisan influences. Furthermore, it should be impartial in its conduct. 
Even the slightest impression of favoritism towards certain candidates or parties will 
damage the integrity of the elections, which can have detrimental consequences for the 
stability of the country. An electoral commission that is structurally independent from 
 
 
23  In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia citizens had citizenship of both Yugoslavia and the Repub-
lic they lived in. Since the latter became increasingly irrelevant, however, many citizens did not bother to 
change it when moving within Yugoslavia (Spaskovska 2011; Ragazzi/Balalovska 2011). 
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government and consists of neutral experts will generally be perceived as impartial be-
cause it has no political affiliation. Impartiality is more difficult to establish when the 
EMB members are political party representatives. Government-based models, especially 
in post-conflict states, may be suspected of favoring the incumbent (Wall et al. 2006: 22-
23). Transparency of EMB activities, such as the registration of parties and voters, count-
ing, and financial management will boost the public’s perception of the EMB’s impartial-
ity (Elklit/Reynolds 2002: 90; Wall et al. 2006: 24). The authority and competence of the 
EMB are dependent on the motivation and technical ability of its members (Elk-
lit/Reynolds 2002: 89-90). Newly established EMBs may suffer from a lack of knowledge 
and experience, which may be confused with corruption or malpractice. Professional 
trainings for election officials to boost professionalism and efficiency are crucial in this 
regard. Lastly, an EMB should have adequate resources to organize and conduct the elec-
tions in an effective way. 
Theoretically, an EMB existing of technocrats with no political affiliation would fulfill 
these criteria for political integrity best. Forming such a commission of technocrats has 
therefore been the strategy in South Sudan. In order to qualify as a member of the Na-
tional Elections Commission (NEC), which is responsible for the organization and man-
agement of the elections, a person should be “of proven integrity, independent, compe-
tent, non-partisan and impartial”24. Commissioners are nominated by the President “after 
consultation with women and civil society groups” (NEA Article 10.2) and should be ap-
proved by the National Legislative Assembly. The risk of having a commission of techno-
crats is, however, that the impartiality of its members is not quantifiable and is therefore 
bound to lead to differences of opinion. In Sierra Leone, for example, during the 2002 
elections the National Electoral Commission was accused of being biased towards the 
incumbent SLPP, which draws the majority of its voters from the country’s largest ethnic 
group, the Mende (Pratt 2012; The Carter Center 2003: 25). During the subsequent elec-
tions in 2007, some newspapers criticized the commission for favoring the opposition 
party All People’s Congress (APC), which has a traditional support base among the ethnic 
Limba and, since its merger with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 2007, can also 
count on considerable support from the ethnic Temne25 (Rosset/Pfister 2013: 12). In 
South Sudan, the rather vague selection criteria for the Commissioners combined with 
the prominent role of the President in their nomination can similarly lead to accusations 
of ethnic bias towards certain groups over others, as some groups undoubtedly feel un-
derrepresented. Indeed, as NEC Commissioner Mac Maika Deng pointed out: “Commis-
sioners’ appointments are a delicate process, which everyone tries to influence. Some 
people argue that there has to be ethnic representation, but the National Elections Act 
stipulates that only ability and capability matter”.26 To prevent allegations about the (per-
 
 
24  Furthermore, the candidate should fulfil some technical criteria relating to nationality, age, education, 
criminal record and past political activity. National Elections Act (NEA) 2012, Article 10.2(b). 
25  Minorities at Risk Data: Assessment for Temne in Sierra Leone, http://bit.ly/173wKMy (21 August 2013). 
26  Interview by Sofie Dreef with Mr. Mac Maika Deng, Chief Electoral Officer at the NEC; 12 February 2013 
in Juba, South Sudan. 
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ceived) incompetence and/or partiality of the electoral management body, it could be an 
advantage to apply the principles of descriptive representation also to the composition of 
the EMB in divided societies. Having a member of their own ethnic group represent them 
in the EMB can build trust among people that the EMB will handle its politically sensitive 
mandate in an objective manner. The downside of having ethnic quota for the EMB is 
that ethnicity becomes an even more dominant factor in the electoral process. Although 
in the longer term a commission of technocrats will indeed foster the de-ethnicization of 
politics, when relations between ethnic groups are tense and may easily spiral into vio-
lence, accommodating all groups seems to be the least risky strategy. 
5.2 Interim Conclusion 
The core assignment of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) of South Sudan is to 
ensure the integrity of the 2015 elections in order to prevent different ethnic groups from 
accusing each other of fraud. When designing the criteria for membership of the NEC, 
South Sudan has chosen for a commission of technocrats. The NEC is non-partisan and 
although it is difficult to predict if it will indeed be able to take decisions independently 
and impartially under pressure, at least it has committed itself to these principles. On the 
question what they would do if government officials or politicians would try to meddle 
into the affairs of the NEC, one commissioner said: “We will tell them we are implement-
ing the law [the National Elections Act 2012] that they have passed.”27 The question re-
mains of course whether the Commissioners can retain this firm stand in the heat of the 
electoral competition. It does not harm that the commissioners all had an academic 
and/or professional career and are generally well-respected in society. Some of them al-
ready have experience with organizing elections (in 2010 or the 2011 referendum). Never-
theless, in the context of tense ethnic relations ensuring descriptive representation in the 
commission could have helped to prevent accusations of bias towards certain ethnic 
groups that will undoubtedly arise during the election period. Given its high stakes in the 
current peace in South Sudan, the international community is involved in the profession-
alization of the NEC. The commission gets intensive capacity building trainings from the 
international non-profit organization International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(IFES), whose South Sudan program is funded by the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID). But resources pose an enormous challenge to the NEC. For 
example, during their first months in office the commissioners did not get paid a salary 
due to government austerity resulting from the oil crisis. Only if the international com-
munity continues to be willing to assist the NEC both financially and in terms of human 
capacity building the commission has a chance to minimize the number of disputes that 
will arise as a result of the electoral administration. 
 
 
27  Ibid. 
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6. Electoral Systems 
Of the three features of electoral design that are discussed in this report the electoral sys-
tem has the most far-reaching consequences. Whereas the timing of an election and the 
set-up of the electoral management body impact on the likelihood that election success is 
undermined by violence, the electoral system also has long-term effects on politics. As 
Arend Lijphart points out, “if one wants to change the nature of a particular democracy, 
the electoral system is likely to be the most suitable and effective instrument for doing so” 
(1995: 412). The electoral system sets the rules by which candidates are elected into par-
liament. It impacts on the number of political parties represented in the legislature, their 
coalition and campaigning strategies and may ultimately facilitate or inhibit co-operation 
among the political representatives of different ethnic groups. This section first gives a 
brief overview of the three main types of electoral systems. It then goes on questioning the 
dominant orthodoxy in favor of one particular electoral system, namely list proportional 
representation (list-PR). Instead, it argues that ethnic settlement patterns need to be taken 
into account. Finally, it discusses the electoral system adopted for the 2015 elections in 
South Sudan with a view to the main advantages and drawbacks of the different types of 
electoral systems. 
6.1 Framework of Electoral Systems 
Electoral systems are typically divided into three broad categories – plurality-majority 
systems, proportional representation, and mixed systems – which in turn are divided into 
sub-categories. Note that this typology refers to ideal types; in practice, not two electoral 
systems are identical as they are all subject to specific provisions. Nevertheless, electoral 
systems can be clustered on the basis of their key features.  
There is an inherent tension between plurality-majority systems and proportional rep-
resentation systems. The former are “winner-takes-all” systems which use mostly small, 
single-member electoral districts. They are simple to understand and to use and, accord-
ing to their proponents, lead to decisive policy making by the single-party government. 
Furthermore, they generate local representation as the candidate that wins will represent 
the needs and concerns of his/her district in parliament. The major disadvantage of using 
plurality-majority systems in conflict-prone divided societies is that they strongly favor 
larger political parties, which impedes the representation of ethnic minorities. The exclu-
sion of certain ethnic, regional or religious interests from the political arena might un-
dermine the political stability (Diamond 1999: 14; Lijphart 2004: 100). The most com-
monly used plurality majority system is Single Member Plurality, or “first past the post”.28  
 
 
28  Related electoral systems are the Block Vote, Party Block Vote, Alternative Vote, and Two-Round System. 
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Proportional Representation systems, on the other hand, favor proportionality 
through the use of multi-member electoral districts.29 Most importantly, this facilitates 
descriptive representation, especially when large electoral districts are combined with an 
absence of thresholds. The dominant form of proportional representation is list-
proportional representation (list-PR). Under list-PR each party presents a list of candi-
dates30 to the electorate, who vote for a party rather than a candidate. Seats are distributed 
in proportion to the overall share of votes that the parties receive, which fosters the inclu-
sion of minorities. The downside of using list-PR in divided societies is that this electoral 
system institutionally reinforces ethnic group boundaries and provides little incentive for 
de-ethnicizing politics. Also, the missing geographical link between the parliamentarian 
and his or her constituency may hamper political accountability. 
Mixed systems aim to combine the benefits of list-PR and single-member electoral dis-
tricts, and are gaining popularity. During the 1990s they were widely adopted by democ-
ratizing states all over the world. In mixed systems the legislature is elected partially 
through plurality-majority methods and partially through list-PR. Countries use different 
plurality-majority methods and the balance between the number of proportional seats 
and plurality-majority seats varies greatly. Because the list-PR component of the system 
does not compensate for disproportionality within the single member districts, mixed 
systems do not guarantee overall proportionality and generally benefit larger parties over 
smaller parties (Reilly/Reynolds 1999: 21; Reynolds et al. 2005: 104).31  
6.2 Descriptive Representation and Ethnic Settlement Patterns  
Given the impact of electoral systems on representation and politics more broadly, it is 
remarkable that they are often not deliberately chosen but inherited from colonial times 
or simply copied from neighboring countries (Reilly 2001: 14; Norris 1995: 4). Once es-
tablished, electoral systems are remarkably stable. Political leaders have few incentives to 
change the rules of a game that brought them to power. Thus, until today most former 
British colonies use Single Member Plurality systems whereas two round systems are 
wide-spread in former French colonies.  
 
 
29  In a multi-member electoral district more than one representative is elected into office.  
30  The ordering of candidates on the list can be determined by voters’ preferences (open-list PR, as used, for 
example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina) or by the party top (closed-list PR, as used, for example, in Burundi). 
Another option is that the predetermined ordering of the candidates prevails unless a candidate meets a cer-
tain threshold of preference votes (flexible-list PR, as used, for example, in The Netherlands). Open-list PR 
best ensures accountability between voters and candidates, because the ordering of the candidates on the list 
is determined entirely by voters’ preferences instead of the party top (Samuels, 2005 p. 679). 
31  A related system is the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system that is used in for example Germany. 
In MMP systems the plurality-majority seats are allocated first. The list-PR seats are then used to compen-
sate for the under-representation of small parties and over-representation of larger parties created in the 
single member constituencies. The list-PR component thus balances out the disproportionality produced 
by the plurality-majority component. This leads to more proportional results than in mixed systems 
(Reilly/Reynolds 1999: 22). 
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The secession of new states (such as South Sudan in 2011) and the negotiation of peace 
agreements (like in Bosnia in 1995) are among the few occasions when electoral systems 
are under discussion. Electoral system choice has been widely debated among academics. 
In this debate, proponents of list proportional representation have been dominant and 
have – in their capacity as advisors to governments and/or international organizations – 
exerted considerable influence on the actual choices made. Indeed, list-PR has become the 
de facto norm of UN-initiated post-conflict elections (Reilly 2003: 7). The system is often 
recommended as one element in a more complex system of consociationalism.32 Accord-
ing to consociational theory the risk of political instability in conflict-prone divided socie-
ties can be mitigated by list-PR because it ensures fair descriptive representation. This is 
why many scholars find consociationalism, and therefore list-PR, an attractive option for 
conflict-prone divided societies (Lijphart 2004; Reynolds/Sisk 1998; Reilly/Reynolds 1999; 
Norris 2008).  
Against this dominant orthodoxy in favor of list-PR we argue that the success of elec-
toral systems in conflict-prone divided societies is dependent on a society's ethnic compo-
sition, i.e. the number, size and settlement patterns of politically relevant ethnic groups 
(for a comprehensive discussion, see Wagner/Dreef 2013). Our key criterion for assessing 
the success of electoral systems is the extent to which they facilitate descriptive represen-
tation. Members of ethnic groups often “seem to think that their interests can only be 
appropriately represented by another group member” (Ruedin 2009: 335, with references 
to further studies on this issue). Descriptive representation – a composition of parliament 
that accurately corresponds to the composition of society (Pitkin 1967) – is therefore seen 
as a crucial element of ethnopolitical conflict resolution. Giving formerly excluded groups 
a voice in the political system removes a prime driving force of conflict (Cederman et al. 
2010).  
Almost by definition list-PR facilitates the representation of small political parties in 
parliament, especially when combined with large electoral districts and in absence of an 
electoral threshold (in contrast to for example the 5% threshold in Germany and the 10% 
threshold in Turkey). Wherever minorities do not settle in a particular region but instead 
live throughout the entire country, proponents of proportional representation rightly 
claim that only their preferred system can ensure fair descriptive representation whereas 
plurality-majority systems cannot.  
However, recently published data by Wucherpfennig et al. (2011) on the settlement 
patterns of “politically relevant ethnic groups” demonstrate that dispersed settlements are 
the exception, not the rule. Of the 809 ethnic groups that they coded as politically relevant 
in 2009, 574 (71%) have a set area whereas only 129 (15,9%) are territorially dispersed 
(another 5,3% are “urban” and 1% is “immigrant”). Figures for earlier periods indicate 
 
 
32  The other three features of consociationalism are: (1) a grand coalition in which executive power is shared 
by all significant segments of society; (2) a veto for minorities which they can use when their community’s 
vital interests are at stake; and (3) group autonomy, granting each community internal self-governance in 
areas such as education and culture (Lijphart 1977: 25-44). 
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even higher proportions of groups settling in particular regions, rather than across the 
entire country. In a study of elections in post-war societies, Wagner and Dreef (2013) 
found that in 18 out of 23 cases (78%) of post-conflict elections since 1989 ethnic groups 
did not settle throughout the country but clustered in specific regions; the most promi-
nent exceptions are Hutu and Tutsi in both Rwanda and Burundi. 
Where ethnic groups concentrate in specific regions, they often form local majorities. 
The parties and/or candidates representing the ethnic group can therefore win (almost) all 
votes in these particular districts. Thus in societies were ethnic groups are geographically 
concentrated and constitute local majorities, minority groups can win a fair proportion of 
seats in parliament even under a winner-takes-all system (Bochsler 2007: 11). Macedonia is 
an ideal case to study the effect of electoral systems on the descriptive representation of 
minorities (for a more detailed account, see Wagner 2013). The country is a textbook ex-
ample of a divided society pitting the majority titular nation against the largest minority, the 
ethnic Albanians who mostly settle in the North West of the country around the cities of 
Tetovo, Gostivar and Kičevo.33 Because parliamentary elections were held under a pluralist 
system in 1990 and 1994 and under a list PR system in 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2011,34 there 
are “quasi-experimental conditions” to study the impact of electoral systems on descriptive 
representation. A comparative analysis of the elections demonstrates that ethnic Albanians 
have always been under-represented, i.e. their share of seats in parliament has always been 
lower than their share in the population, regardless of the electoral system used.35 According 
to Ruedin (2009: 340), this is not unusual as “most ethnic minority groups are underrepre-
sented relative to the share in the population” although “a few cases” of overrepresentation 
do exist. Most importantly, however, ethnic Albanians have reached high relative represen-
tation scores under both types of electoral systems. Indeed, the highest score ever reached 
(90% in 1990) was under a pure majoritarian system. 
Wherever ethnic groups concentrate in particular areas and the effects of electoral sys-
tems hardly differ in terms of facilitating fair representation, the choice for the electoral 
system should take into account the possible risks posed by list-PR as well as additional 
advantages of plurality-majority systems. For example, in agrarian societies “with their 
low levels of occupational specialization and class identity”, the case can be made for 
adopting Single Member Plurality. In these societies, “most people define their interests 
and differentiate themselves from one another on the basis of where they live, rather than 
what they do” (Barkan 1995: 107). Because of the importance of local service provision, 
Single Member Plurality (SMP) is a good option for agrarian societies. It establishes close 
ties between parliamentarians and their constituencies and ensures local representation. 
 
 
33  Further minorities include Serbs, Turks, Vlachs and Roma. 
34  The 1998 elections were held under a mixed system. 85 MPs were elected by a majoritarian principle and 
an additional 35 seats were distributed on the basis of proportional representation. 
35  When calculating relative representation scores for ethnic Albanians, it is important to take into account 
that their relative share in the population has been growing from ca. 21% (1990) to ca. 28% (2011). For a 
comprehensive discussion of these calculations see Wagner 2013: 8-10. 
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The most prominent alternative to list-PR is the theory of centripetalism36 developed 
by Donald Horowitz (1985, 2003) and Benjamin Reilly (2001). Its starting point is that 
list-PR in conflict-prone divided societies carries the risk of exacerbating ethnic tensions. 
The system encourages political parties to “adopt bonding strategies”, i.e. to “bring to-
gether citizens who are homogeneous in certain important respects” (Norris 2004: 10). In 
divided societies bonding is likely to happen within and not between ethnic groups. Espe-
cially in the aftermath of a civil war, this often leads to ethnic outbidding. The system 
therefore reinforces ethnic divisions and freezes ethnic group boundaries in the political 
system, instead of integrating and depolarizing society. In the short run the system has the 
potential to consolidate the precarious stability, but it may not be conducive to conflict 
resolution in the long run (Cohen 1997: 628; Reilly 2002: 156; Sisk 2009: 221).37  
According to centripetalism, interethnic accommodation is the basis for peace and 
democracy in divided societies. Reilly defines centripetalism as a “political system or 
strategy designed to focus competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes – 
primarily by presenting rational, office-seeking politicians with incentives to seek elec-
toral support from groups beyond their own ethnic community” (2001: 11). By providing 
incentives for candidates to campaign for the votes of members of other ethnic groups, 
electoral systems can encourage interethnic bargaining and promote accommodative 
behavior. Centripetalists therefore favor majoritarian systems that encourage parties to 
“adopt bridging strategies designed to gather votes promiscuously and indiscriminately 
wherever campaign support can be found among diverse sectors of the electorate” (Norris 
2004: 10). 
Centripetalists strongly favor the Alternative Vote (AV). In this system, voters rank 
candidates in order of preference instead of declaring only their first candidate of choice. 
If a candidate wins an absolute majority of votes (s)he is immediately elected. If no candi-
date gains an absolute majority, however, the candidate with the fewest first preference 
votes is eliminated from the count. The second preferences on these ballots are then allo-
cated to the remaining candidates. This process is repeated until one candidate has an 
absolute majority. As candidates are reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of 
ethnic groups other than their own, the system provides a strong incentive for candidates 
to broaden their support base beyond the own ethnic group and to form pre-electoral 
interethnic coalitions in order to gain election. The key merit of AV is thus that it requires 
a moderate and accommodative attitude of the candidates in order to effectively gain 
 
 
36  The term ‘centripetalism’ has been coined by Sisk (1995: 19). 
37  The example of Bosnia proves a case in point. Taking into account the history of violence and consequent 
deep ethnic divisions in society and the maximalist objectives of the dominant parties, list-PR has been ef-
fective in fostering stability in the country (Caspersen 2004: 569). Yet the system has been unsuccessful in 
promoting moderate and accommodative politics. The negotiations following the most recent elections of 
2010 were deadlocked for over a year. Parties failed to come to an agreement about a working coalition, 
the division of ministerial posts and reform agendas, or refused to participate in the negotiations alto-
gether (ICG Crisis Watch 90, 2011). Proportional representation may have been the only viable option at 
the end of the conflict, but more than a decade later the system has not facilitated interethnic accommo-
dation. 
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votes from other groups. Furthermore, it guarantees local representation through the use 
of small single-member electoral districts (Horowitz 2003: 122-124).  
The Two-Round System (TRS) shares important features with AV. In a TRS candi-
dates also need a majority of the votes to be elected. If no candidate reaches a majority in 
the first round a second round of voting is conducted. Most commonly the two candi-
dates from the first round who gained the most votes compete in the second round. An-
other method is to have all candidates that passed a certain threshold in the first round, 
compete in the second round. Like AV, Two-Round Systems “encourage candidates to 
broaden their support base in search of a majority” (Reilly 2001: 28). However, in contrast 
to AV, TRS encourages campaigning beyond a candidate’s ethnic core constituency only 
once (s)he has made it into the second round. As a consequence, the centripetal effect of 
TRS is limited as candidates may feel encouraged to first maximize their core constitu-
ency’s vote before reaching out to other groups. According to Reilly, TRS have “a much 
weaker (and later) set of incentives for accommodative behavior than is the case with 
preferential systems” (2001: 30).  
The debate between proponents of list-PR and centripetalist systems for conflict-prone 
divided societies is couched in generic terms, without taking into account the effect of 
ethnic settlement patterns. Advocates of either model dismiss the differences between 
divided societies and instead recommend “their” system across the board. This approach 
misses the nuances of the workings of electoral systems. Divided societies are not homo-
geneous, but differ among other things in terms of the settlement patterns of ethnic 
groups. We argue that this should be taken into account when choosing the electoral sys-
tem. Whereas list-PR is the only viable option for societies were ethnic groups live inter-
mingled throughout the country, wherever ethnic groups form local majorities other elec-
toral systems can have similar inclusionary effects. In these cases it may therefore be 
worthwhile to look into other electoral systems than list-PR and their potential benefits 
for peacebuilding. The centripetalist model presents an interesting alternative, especially 
with a view to long-term ethnopolitical conflict resolution. 
6.3 Interim Conclusion  
The National Elections Act 2012 that establishes the electoral system in South Sudan was 
drafted by the Ministry of Justice with the support from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems. The assignment the Ministry gave to IFES was to keep the National 
Elections Act of Sudan, under which the 2010 elections were held, as much as possible 
intact. As a result, South Sudan adopted a mixed system similar to the system of Sudan. 
Members of the National Legislative Assembly are elected partially through Single Mem-
ber Plurality (60%) and partially through list-proportional representation, with 15% of the 
seats allocated through closed-list PR and 25% through closed-list PR reserved exclusively 
for women.38 
 
 
38  National Elections Act 2012, Article 60(2). 
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The main problem with having a mixed system in a country like South Sudan is that it 
is quite complicated both for voters, parties and the National Electoral Commission that 
is tasked with the administration of the elections. Voters have to cast their votes on three 
different ballot papers for the National Legislative Assembly only,39 which is even more 
problematic in a country where illiteracy rates are as high as in South Sudan. Political 
parties have to organize themselves both nationally and per state, and have to present 
both a party list and a women’s list. Except for the SPLM – and to an extent, the SPLM-
DC – political parties in South Sudan are poorly organized, lack finances and will have 
great difficulty preparing adequate candidate lists. Lastly, a mixed system poses additional 
challenges to the NEC in terms of for example civic and voter education.40 For this reason, 
IFES pointed out to the Ministry of Justice the possibility to adopt either Single Member 
Plurality or list-PR with a women quota,41 but the MoJ decided to stick with the mixed 
system.  
Given the plurality of ethnic groups living in South Sudan, many of which live in a 
state of animosity with one another, it is crucial that the electoral system fosters descrip-
tive representation. Ethnic groups in South Sudan live concentrated in particular regions. 
Therefore, both SMP and list-PR can facilitate descriptive representation. There are, how-
ever, two caveats that have to be taken into account. First, given the absence of an up-to-
date census there are no accurate numbers on the size and settlement areas of the ethnic 
groups. The map of UN OCHA (see footnote 9), for example, was drawn up in 2009: be-
fore independence and during a period when vast numbers of refugees and IDPs were on 
the move. Drawing boundary demarcations on the basis of these data poses the risk of 
minority exclusion under SMP, if boundaries are drawn on the ‘wrong’ side of the ethnic 
divide. Furthermore, even if a new census would be done prior to the 2015 elections as the 
basis for boundary demarcation the pastoralist lifestyle of many South Sudanese ethnic 
groups makes it difficult to determine the exact settlement location of these groups. In-
deed, most ethnic violence occurs on the, rather fluid, ‘borders’ between ethnic groups. 
For these reasons, SMP may actually have a hard time facilitating descriptive representa-
tion. On the contrary, it may provoke ethnopolitical violence if one of the groups feels 
excluded. 
The obvious alternative to SMP is list-PR. Regardless of the settlement patterns of eth-
nic groups list-PR will facilitate descriptive representation and thus mitigates the risk of 
ethnopolitical conflict. Although list-PR would serve the purpose of including minority 
ethnic groups in parliament, the lack of local representation would be problematic in 
 
 
39  Plus, they have to cast votes for the President, Governor, and three votes for the State Legislative Assem-
bly that uses the same mixed system as the NLA, because the elections have not been logged (see chapter 3 
on Timing and Sequencing). 
40  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with Mr. Matthew Dominic, Senior Electoral Affairs Officer of the 
Political Division of the United Nations Mission In South Sudan (UNMISS); 13 February 2013 in Juba, 
South Sudan. 
41  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with Ms Eliane Torres, Electoral Management Adviser at IFES South 
Sudan; 8 February 2013 in Juba, South Sudan. 
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South Sudan. Besides the population of Juba most people live in remote areas where 
hardly any public services are in place. In order for service delivery to improve, a strong 
geographical link between parliamentarians and their constituencies is crucial. Local rep-
resentation also improves accountability. Because candidates compete with each other 
directly for a seat, they are likely to take responsibility for the people of their constituency 
and represent their interest in the NLA.42 Candidates competing under list-PR, on the 
other hand, are likely to be loyal first and foremost to their party secretariat as they com-
pose the candidate list. One interviewee observed that the stronger MPs generally are 
those elected under SMP.43 
Therefore, despite the administrative difficulties we nevertheless believe that a mixed 
system at this point is the best electoral system for South Sudan. It fosters a considerable 
degree of descriptive representation, while at the same time it also ensures strong geo-
graphical links between parliamentarians and their constituencies. Civic and voter educa-
tion will certainly prove challenging, but this would be true also for other electoral sys-
tems simply because South Sudan has no democratic tradition and very low levels of 
education. We would recommend, however, replacing the closed-list system, which is the 
least democratic form of list-PR, with an open-list system. Most importantly, unlike in 
most countries the electoral system should remain a topic for debate and open to change 
if the situation requires so. 
7. Conclusions and Implications for the 2015 Elections 
in South Sudan 
In conflict-prone divided societies, elections carry the risk of triggering ethnic violence 
because of their competitive and polarizing nature. Given the intrinsic and instrumental 
merits of democracy, however, avoiding elections is no serious alternative. Rather, the 
challenge is to design elections in a way that minimizes the risk of violence. 
In this report we have discussed three key features of electoral engineering: timing and 
sequencing; electoral administration; and electoral system design. The lessons learned 
from the growing number of elections in conflict-prone divided societies seem clearest 
with a view to timing and electoral administration. Scholars with different theoretical and 
methodological preferences concur that in countries with a recent history of ethnic civil 
war, the risk of renewed violence can be lowered by not having elections soon after the 
end of the conflict. In a similar vein, observers agree that the success of electoral admini-
strations is heavily dependent on the amount of human, physical and financial resources 
 
 
42  Interview conducted by Sofie Dreef with the staff of a South Sudanese NGO; 19 February 2013 in Juba, 
South Sudan. 
43  Ibid. 
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available. The ideal composition of the EMB is, however, more ambiguous. The main task 
of the EMB is to ensure electoral integrity. This may be best left to a commission of tech-
nocrats, which are appointed by applying the principles of descriptive representation. 
Such an ethnic quota may serve as a reassurance to the ethnic groups that they will not be 
disadvantaged.  
In contrast to timing and electoral administration, electoral system choice has been 
discussed most controversially. This debate has been dominated by consociationalists 
whose preferred list-PR system has risen to the golden standard in electoral engineering. 
The aim of this report is not to replace this standard by a new one but to caution against 
overstating the case for list-PR. To be sure, list-PR hardly ever does major harm in con-
flict-prone divided societies because it indeed facilitates the fair representation of all po-
litically relevant ethnic groups in parliament. At the same time, however, the system en-
courages bonding strategies that often go hand in hand with ethnic outbidding. As a 
consequence, the long-term prospects of overcoming ethnic divisions are not well served 
by a list-PR system. Majoritarian systems, particularly the Alternative Vote, are better 
suited to encourage bridging strategies of political parties and thus contribute to over-
coming ethnic divisions. Furthermore, countries with a high need for local service deliv-
ery may be served by SMP which fosters a strong bond between MPs and their constitu-
encies. 
Unfortunately, in our view, the debate about electoral systems has been focused on 
finding one-size-fits-all solutions with proponents of list-PR, Single Member Plurality 
and centripetalist electoral models arguing in favor of “their” pet system for all societies 
across the board. In contrast, we argue that divided societies are too diverse to allow for 
such recommendations. Regionally concentrated minorities, if constituting local majori-
ties, can achieve fair representation in parliament under both plurality-majority and pro-
portional systems. The same would certainly not work when ethnic groups do not form 
regional majorities but settle throughout the country. The choice of electoral system 
should therefore be made dependent on the settlement patterns of ethnic groups. First 
and foremost the electoral system should ensure high levels of descriptive representation. 
If multiple systems have this effect, the additional benefits of the systems should inform 
the final choice. 
More than a year before the first South Sudanese elections since independence, it is 
hard to predict how the elections will impact inter-ethnic relations in the country. Much 
will depend on how the current power struggle within the SPLM – with as the most recent 
development, the dismissal of Vice President Machar (a Nuer) by President Kiir (a Dinka) 
– will develop. Will there be a split in the SPLM, the former liberation movement and de 
facto only political party in South Sudan, and if so, will this split be along ethnic lines? 
Will other political parties get the political space and resources to organize themselves? 
What will be the role of the SPLA, the former military wing of the SPLM and now the 
official army of South Sudan? 
Although these and undoubtedly many other political issues will determine the success 
of the 2015 elections – defined here as the absence of ethnic violence – through electoral 
engineering the uncertainty of the political situation can, to an extent, be mitigated. With 
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regard to the timing and sequencing of elections it is pertinent that if the situation allows 
it, elections do take place in 2015. Preparations have started already, and establishing a 
regular election cycle (the last elections – in the whole of Sudan – were in 2010) is vital for 
the stabilization of both the fragile democratic regime and the prevention of increasing 
inter-ethnic violence. Elections provide an incentive for opposition parties to form and 
professionalize and to challenge the current monopoly of the SPLM. Also, elections will 
empower the people of South Sudan by providing them a means to hold their government 
accountable. Although the administration of the elections will be highly challenging, es-
pecially since the various elections are not sequenced but held all at once, the situation is 
unlikely to improve in the short to medium-term. There is therefore no point to postpon-
ing the elections. 
The National Electoral Commission stands before the Herculean task of administering 
elections in South Sudan. They are hindered by the long rainy season that makes large 
parts of the country inaccessible, a chronic lack of financial and human resources, the 
absence of a democratic culture and a largely uneducated population, to name only a few 
challenges. Yet the stakes are high for the international community that for so many years 
supported the peace process between the North and the South, and having South Sudan 
spiraling into an ethnic civil war is what they want to avoid at all costs. International do-
nors, most noticeably UNMISS and USAID, are strongly committed to the 2015 elections 
and provide support in the form of financial, physical and human capital. With this sup-
port to the NEC, electoral administration will not prove a major issue in 2015. Whether 
the NEC will be viewed as credible and impartial will depend of course on their own be-
havior when politicians will try to influence them.  
Unless the permanent constitution will provide for another electoral system (and is 
ready before the 2015 elections, which given the pace of the constitutional review process 
is unlikely), the elections will be held under a mixed system. This system has the advan-
tage that it facilitates both descriptive representation, because of the list-PR component, 
and local representation through single member constituencies. Although a pure list-PR 
or SMP system would be easier in terms of electoral administration, list-PR fails to pro-
vide the link between MPs and their constituencies that is so important for the develop-
ment of South Sudan’s remote countryside, whereas SMP risks the exclusion of minorities 
if district boundaries do not follow the settlement patterns of the ethnic groups. The 
mixed system could be improved, however, by replacing the closed-lists with open-lists. 
This would shift the power away from the political party bosses to the people and is thus 
much more democratic. Because in an open-list system voters determine the candidates’ 
position on the list, candidates will have to work on their relationship with the voters 
more directly. 
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